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EVIL’S INSCRUTABILITY 
IN ARENDT AND LEVINAS1
İmge Oranli
Since 2001, quite a few volumes in Continental philosophy have been dedicated 
to the topic of evil. Most of these works make reference to the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks.2 In these studies, the terms “evil” and “terrorism” imply 
one another, suggesting that the epitome of evil in the 21st century is found in 
the terrorist acts committed by Islamist3 groups. Although some reject defin-
ing terrorism as evil4, the common tendency has been to use these terms in 
conjunction. Observing the parallelism drawn between the terms “evil” and 
“terrorism” in the Continental literature on evil, my contention is that this 
parallelism is connected to the idea that evil is an inscrutable phenomenon.5 
1. This article works through some of the ideas that have been put forward in my PhD dis-
sertation (2015), which partially examines the legacy of Kant’s theory of evil in Continental 
philosophy. I am grateful to Tina Chanter, Nisa Göksel and Elif Yavnık for their helpful com-
ments. I would also like to thank the editors of the special issue, Martin Thibodeau and Joël 
Madore, for inviting me to contribute, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful com-
ments. 
2. Some of the most well-known works published since 2001 that refer to 9/11 are as follows: 
Alan D. Schrift (ed.) Modernity and the Problem of Evil, Bloomington IN, Indiana University 
Press, 2005; Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, 
Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2002; Richard J. Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philo-
sophical Interrogation, Malden MA, Blackwell, 2002; Peter Dews, The Idea of Evil, Malden MA, 
Blackwell, 2008.
3. The term “Islamist,” as opposed to “Islamic,” has been suggested as a more appropriate 
term for identifying agents who engage in terrorist violence in the name of Islam, as it refers to 
“a political ideology that strives to derive legitimacy from Islam.” See Soner Cagaptay, 
“‘Islamist’ or ‘Islamic’? The Difference is Huge,” The Washington Institute, July 11, 2016, http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/islamist-or-islamic-the-difference-is-huge.
4. See Terry Eagleton, An Essay on Evil, New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 2010, p. 159.
5. In the mainstream interpretation, Islamist terrorists are depicted as inscrutable, in the 
sense of being devoid of rational motives. As cultural anthropologist Talal Asad puts it, “their 
motives are unexpressed” (On Suicide Bombing, New York NY, Columbia University Press, 2007, 
p. 30). Similarly, scholar Marie Breen Smyth suggests that there is “a climate where comprehen-
sive processes of ‘othering’ and demonizing the ‘terrorist’ […] subject” occurs, which then hides 
the political motivation of these groups” (“Subjectivities, ‘suspect communities,’ governments, 
and the ethics of research on ‘terrorism’” in Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen 
Gunning (eds.), Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, New York NY, Routledge, 
2009, p.195. Furthermore, Başak Ertür notes that the process of “becoming a terrorist” is 
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Continental scholars have suggested that we are forced to rethink the category 
of evil as we face acts of terrorism on a global scale. In light of this sugges-
tion, this paper traces the idea of the “inscrutability of evil” as a common, yet 
overlooked theme in Continental philosophy. This idea finds its first modern 
formulation in Kant’s theory of radical evil. Here, I argue that Hannah Arendt 
and Emmanuel Levinas follow Kant in identifying evil as an inscrutable phe-
nomenon. Discerning this theme in their accounts is significant because it 
underscores that Levinas and Arendt rely on the framework of Kant’s theory 
of evil, despite the fact that they wish to distance themselves from it. And more 
importantly, we must attend to evil’s inscrutability, which I argue is a shared 
theme in Kant’s, Levinas’ and Arendt’s approaches, because it continues to 
dominate our approach to the question of evil today, and, I think, occludes our 
thinking, in particular with respect to the phenomenon of global terrorism.
My aim, then, is to reorient Continental scholarship on evil by showing 
that Kant, Arendt and Levinas all appeal to its inscrutability6, although their 
accounts of why evil is inscrutable differ considerably. Although Arendt’s 
interpretation of Kant’s notion of radical evil has been a point of dispute 
among critics7, none of the critics have focused upon inscrutability as the 
common element in Arendt’s and Kant’s accounts of evil.8 Neither have critics 
underscored inscrutability as a shared marker of evil in Levinas’ and Kant’s 
accounts. While all three thinkers agree that evil cannot be rationalized, 
integrated into reason, or understood within the framework of a theodicy, for 
Kant evil is inscrutable because it is grounded in freedom. For Arendt, evil is 
explained away with the term “radicalization,” a process which does not disclose the extremely 
violent social, historical, and geographical contexts within which this radicalization is fostered. 
She states, “the mainstream institutional approach to “explaining” terrorism has also shifted in 
the fifteen years […] after 2004 the concept of “radicalization” began to have currency in policy-
making and policing, first in the UK, and soon after in the US. […] the notion of radicalization 
is based on the assumption that terrorists come from a wider milieu of non-violent extremism, 
and that a combination of individual psychological circumstances, and theological and ideo-
logical indoctrination turns some extremists into terrorists.” (Başak Ertür, “The Onus of 
Thought in the War on Terror,” Theory & Event, 20 (2017), p. 70.
6. I focus on the concept of inscrutability as well as relevant senses associated with this 
term, such as the incomprehensible, inexpressible, and unaccountable. 
7. For Arendt’s interpretation of Kant’s notion of radical evil, see Hannah Arendt, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, New York NY, Harcourt Press – Brace & Co., 1951, p. 459. The most 
well-known criticism of Arendt has been offered by Henry Allison. See Henry E. Allison, 
“Reflections on the Banality of (Radical) Evil: A Kantian Analysis,” in Maria Pia Lara (ed.), 
Rethinking Evil, New York NY, Columbia University Press, 2007. Richard Bernstein notes 
Arendt’s critical relation to Kant on the question of evil; see Richard Bernstein, “Arendt: 
Radical Evil and the Banality of Evil,” in Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation, Malden 
MA, Polity Press, 2002, p. 208, see also p. 214.
8. Although Bernstein does not suggest evil’s inscrutability as a common theme in Kant’s, 
Arendt’s and Levinas’ approaches, he does underline “inscrutability” and “incomprehensibility” 
in his analyses of their accounts. See Richard Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical 
Interrogation, p. 12, see also pp. 44-45 and p. 175. 
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inscrutable because it is “banal.” And for Levinas, evil is inscrutable because 
it is “excessive” and “useless.” My analysis demonstrates that inscrutability is 
an essential marker of the concept of evil, since it is found in all three accounts 
as a feature of evil, regardless of the fact that in each account a different type 
of evil is at stake (moral, political and existential, respectively).
Although they have strikingly different philosophical approaches, both 
Arendt and Levinas discuss evil’s inscrutability within the context of the 
Holocaust. Arendt locates evil as a profoundly political issue, whereas for 
Levinas it is at the very core of existence. In distinction from both, Kant speaks 
of evil as a moral issue–as a problem of how an individual must and must not 
act. The Kantian doctrine of radical evil, considered on its own, does not 
provide us with the intellectual tools to grasp the emergence of evil actions in 
the social sphere because Kant limits the discussion of evil to the adoption of 
maxims by the individual.9 To put it differently, the question of how the indi-
vidual is politically motivated to engage in evil actions is not addressed in the 
doctrine of radical evil, because Kant identifies evil as an innate propensity of 
the human species.
Regardless of their difference from Kant, I argue that Arendt’s identifica-
tion of Nazi evil as banal (i.e., without depth; spreading like a “fungus”10) 
and Levinas’ description of evil as useless (through his notion of “useless 
suffering”11) are both developed in the trajectory of thought facilitated by 
Kant’s doctrine of radical evil. This trajectory is marked by two aspects: evil’s 
non-theological nature and its inscrutability. 
There is general agreement that Kant’s theory of evil is significant because 
it departs from previous theorizations of evil, which confine it to theodicy. I 
begin by reviewing Kant’s doctrine of radical evil as the first modern account 
in which the question of evil is treated beyond theodicy. Having outlined how 
Kant’s account of evil moves beyond theodicy, I then go on to suggest that 
Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, and his ethical commitments in general, 
9. Although in isolation Kant’s doctrine of radical evil limits the discussion of evil to the 
individual, there have been attempts to connect the doctrine of radical evil to Kant’s anthropo-
logical writings, as suggested by Allen Wood, Philip Rossi and Sharen Anderson-Gold. These 
efforts have successfully shown that the doctrine of radical evil is supported by Kant’s notion 
of “unsocial sociability” (i.e., the antagonistic tendencies of the individual within his/her social 
world). To follow this discussion further, see Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 286-291; Philip Rossi, The Social Authority of Reason: 
Kant’s Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind, Albany NY, SUNY Press, 2005, 
pp. 77-79; Sharon Anderson-Gold, “God and Community: An Inquiry into the Religious 
Implications of the Highest Good,” in Philip Rossi, and Michael J. Wreen (eds.), Kant’s 
Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1991 (referenced 
by Allen Wood in Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 287, n. 8).
10. Hannah Arendt, Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age, New 
York NY, Grove Press, 1978, p. 251.
11. Emmanuel Levinas, “Useless Suffering.” Entre Nous. Essays on Thinking-of-the-Other, 
trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav, New York NY, Continuum, 2006.
SE 70.3.corr.indd   343 2018-07-31   9:23 AM
  .  oranlı 
 constitute the most decisive theoretical grounds for Arendt’s and Levinas’ 
rethinking of evil. Both philosophers follow Kant in locating evil beyond 
theodicy. However, unlike Kant, they emphasize its political, existential and 
“useless” nature. According to Levinas, the philosophy of Hitlerism is the 
political foundation of an evil that is “useless.” Similarly, for Arendt, the 
totalitarian nature of Nazi rule has no utilitarian purpose for the suffering 
that it causes. For both thinkers, then, what characterizes the nature of Nazi 
evil is its non-pragmatic essence, and this is the sense in which Levinas calls 
evil “excessive” and Arendt calls it “unprecedented.” 
Kant’s doctrine of radical evil and evil’s inscrutability 
Kant scholarship is replete with endless debates as to what Kant means by 
radical evil, i.e., “the propensity towards evil in human nature.” My interpre-
tation does not focus on these debates. Rather, my aim is to highlight two 
points that are central to my argument: Kant’s notion of radical evil situates 
evil beyond theodicy and it grounds the source of evil in a maxim (i.e., in 
human freedom). The substance of his claim that evil is an inscrutable phe-
nomenon is contained in the move beyond theodicy and Kant’s identification 
of the source of evil in a maxim. 
Kant’s notion of radical evil has puzzled many of his critics since it first 
appeared on the pages of Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1792. His contemporaries 
interpreted Kant’s account as a reconfiguration of the doctrine of original sin. 
According to this view, Kant compromised his critical philosophy in order to 
maintain a source of evil within human nature. However, a close look at 
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone reveals that Kant’s notion of radical 
evil is not a return to the doctrine of original sin. In fact, it is a direct chal-
lenge to the doctrine of original sin, insofar as he wishes to think evil within 
the boundaries of reason. With the notion of radical evil, Kant attempts to 
think evil beyond “the problem of evil,” challenging the accounts of theodicy. 
In the Religion, to oppose the idea that original sin is the source of moral evil, 
Kant proposes situating the origin of moral evil neither in time nor in an event, 
but rather in relation to reason.12 What this means is that moral evil will be 
considered as an effect, the cause of which will depend on the laws of freedom. 
Kant considers freedom of choice to be the ultimate cause that makes possible 
the existence of both good and evil. According to Kant, the predicates “good” 
and “evil” are not ascribed to people on the basis of experience, but rather on 
the basis of maxims – those subjective principles upon which one determines 
12. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, 
ed. and trans. Allen Wood, George di Giovanni, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 
6:42-43. Hereafter cited as Religion.
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one’s freedom of choice (Willkür). Hence, what makes someone evil is not the 
performance of evil actions, but rather her maxims. 
Kant coins the term “radical evil” to refer to a propensity towards evil. To 
be more exact, it is the adjective “radical” that signifies this common propen-
sity in human nature. Hence, the adjective “radical” does not refer to evil’s 
magnitude, to its intensity, or to its extremity. Rather, as Henry Allison sug-
gests, it refers to “the root or ground of the very possibility of all moral evil.”13 
In other words, all evils committed by humans are enabled by this propensity. 
Evil is radical only in the sense of its commonality; that all humans have an 
inherent propensity towards it. Furthermore, what makes someone evil is not 
the performance of evil actions, as I have stated above. Kant writes, “the judg-
ment that an agent is an evil human being cannot reliably be based on 
experience.”14 And he continues, “we call a human being evil, however, not 
because he performs actions that are evil (contrary to law), but because these 
are so constituted that they allow the inference of evil maxims in him.”15 
According to Kant, then, a person is evil because she adopts evil maxims. 
Evil maxims are those maxims that incorporate subjective incentives rather 
than the objective incentive of the moral law. As Gordon E. Michalson argues, 
“the distilled product of moral evil resides in the form of a maxim, the evil 
itself is a property of the act of the will that freely subordinates one incentive 
to another, the moral to the sensuous.”16 The crucial point here is that the 
adoption of the evil maxim is not grounded in experience. Kant writes in the 
Religion:
In order, then, to call a human being evil, it must be possible to infer a priori from 
a number of consciously evil actions […] an underlying evil maxim, and, from 
this, the presence in the subject of a common ground, itself a maxim, of all par-
ticular morally evil maxims.17
This common ground is what Kant identifies as “the propensity to evil in 
human nature.” This ground is inferred from the adoption of evil maxims and 
is itself a maxim. This inference of an evil maxim underlying other evil max-
ims shows, according to Kant, the human propensity towards evil. As a result, 
Kant stresses that we have a propensity to adopt maxims that are immoral. 
Here, with the concept of “propensity,” Kant wishes to underline that although 
this inclination towards choosing immoral maxims is natural (or innate), it 
13. Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, New York NY, Cambridge University Press, 
1990, p. 147. 
14. Immanuel Kant, Religion, 6:20.
15. Ibid. 
16. Gordon E. Michalson, “The Inscrutability of Moral Evil in Kant,” The Thomist, 51 
(1987), pp. 246-269 (p. 250).
17. Immanuel Kant, Religion, 6:20.
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can be understood as “brought by the human being upon himself.”18 How can 
there be a natural propensity to evil in humans and at the same time free 
choice to commit evil? As many have suggested, this perplexity lies at the heart 
of the Kantian notion of radical evil, and is inherently connected to Kant’s 
understanding of human freedom. 
On this point, Kantian scholarship has offered diverging interpretations. 
Critics such as Bernstein and Michalson suggest that Kant does not offer an 
explanation as to why evil exists, which ultimately renders evil an inscrutable 
phenomenon.19 On a different note, Allen Wood suggests that Kant’s doctrine 
of radical evil should be read as part of his Anthropology. In his suggestion, 
Wood is accompanied by scholars Philip Rossi20 and Sharon Anderson-Gold, 
who consider the notion of radical evil to be linked to the idea of the progress 
of humanity.21 
In his doctrine, Kant identifies three types of radical evil.22 The upshot of 
Kant’s argument about the three types of evil is that his doctrine of radical 
evil contains no idea of a diabolical will (wanting evil for its own sake).23 Kant 
writes, 
18. Having a “propensity” to evil means according to Kant the following: “It is distinguished 
from a disposition in that a propensity can indeed be innate yet may be represented as not being 
as such: it can rather be thought of […] (if evil) as brought by the human being upon himself.” 
(Religion, 6:29) 
19. My reading of Kant’s radical evil is very much in line with that of Michalson and 
Bernstein, who ultimately argue that it is the attempt to ground evil in the free choice of the 
will (i.e., freely choosing an evil maxim) that makes evil inscrutable according to Kant. For their 
discussion, see Gordon E. Michalson, “The Inscrutability of Moral Evil in Kant” and Richard 
Bernstein, “Radical Evil: Kant at War with Himself,” in Radical Evil: A Philosophical 
Interrogation, pp. 11-45.
20. Philip Rossi (The Social Authority of Reason: Kant’s Critique, Radical Evil, and the 
Destiny of Humankind, Albany NY, SUNY Press, 2005, p. 79) reads Kant’s doctrine of radical 
evil together with “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” where 
Kant discusses antagonism (“unsociable sociability”) as a necessary element for the progress of 
humanity. Rossi writes that “unsociable sociability is an integral element in the completion of 
his account of radical evil in human life. It functions as the condition for actualizing the human 
propensity to evil.” 
21. Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 288.
22. The first type is referred to as “frailty” and it is the condition in which the subjective 
incentive is stronger than the objective one, even though the objective incentive is rationally 
understood to be desirable. This is a case in which the subjective incentive overpowers the objec-
tive incentive, yet the author of the act is aware of this weakness. The second type of evil is called 
“impurity.” This is when the objective incentive is not adopted for its own sake, but is supported 
based on a subjective incentive – for example, when we help someone in order to feel good about 
ourselves. The third type of evil is called “corruption or perversity.” This happens when the 
ordering of the incentives is reversed – namely, when the moral incentive is not given priority 
in determining the character of the maxims. For Kant’s discussion, see Religion 6:29-31.
23. Wood generally agrees with Allison and others on this point. However, he also suggests 
that there is a situation that is close to “doing evil for evil’s sake.” In the case of the third type 
of radical evil (namely, corruption), if “someone chooses to disobey the moral law simply because 
they know that obeying it is what they ought to do,” this, according to Wood, could be consid-
ered an instance of doing evil for its own sake (Allen Wood, “Kant and the Intelligibility of 
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Whenever we therefore say, “The human being is by nature good,” or, “He is by 
nature evil,” this only means that he holds within himself a first ground (to us 
inscrutable) [emphasis added] for the adoption of good or evil (unlawful) max-
ims […].24
In a footnote to this passage, Kant further explains what he means by the terms 
“ground” and “inscrutable.” Ground, in this context, is a maxim; it is the first 
adopted evil maxim, and in being so, it expresses the propensity to evil in 
human nature. Kant calls this first evil maxim the ground because it implies 
the possibility of adopting other evil maxims. That is to say, it is not a ground 
because it generates a maxim. Rather, it is a ground whose very existence 
informs us that the adoption of further evil maxims is possible:
That the first subjective ground of the adoption of moral maxims is inscrutable 
[emphasis added] can be seen provisionally from this: Since the adoption is free, 
its ground (i.e., why I have adopted an evil maxim and not a good one instead) 
must not be sought in any incentive of nature, but always again in a maxim […] 
without ever being able to come to the first ground.25 
As this passage suggests, the adoption of the first evil maxim is inscrutable 
because it is the result of an act of freedom. Furthermore, this ground is a 
freely adopted maxim, and therefore cannot be explained with respect to any 
incentive of nature. Hence, the first evil maxim is presupposed rather than 
explained. The consequence of Kant’s argument is that evil is inscrutable 
because evil is grounded in freedom of choice.26 The implication of this for his 
morality is that the moral law has to be articulated as a categorical imperative 
precisely because humans have this natural propensity to evil. 
In the following section, I turn to Arendt’s reflections on evil with a focus 
on her two notions of evil (i.e., radical evil and banality of evil). As will become 
clear, Arendt’s notion of radical evil is a direct response to Kant’s. Arendt is 
critical of Kant for not articulating an adequate account of evil to capture 
politically motivated evildoing. Taking this task upon herself, Arendt’s theo-
retical move will be to coin the term “banality of evil.” By way of this term, 
Arendt moves the category of evil away from morality to situate it within the 
realm of politics. With this move, I argue, her remarks about evil formulate a 
distinct and peculiar new ontology of evil. This new ontology departs from 
that of Kant’s in that rather than viewing evil as a positive phenomenon like 
Evil,” in Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (eds.), Kant’s Anatomy of Evil, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 155. 
24. Immanuel Kant, Religion, 6:21.
25. Immanuel Kant, Religion, 6:21 ft.
26. For an in-depth analysis of the inscrutability of evil in Kant, see Allen W. Wood, “Kant 
and the Intelligibility of Evil”; Gordon E. Michalson, “The Inscrutability of Moral Evil in Kant”; 
Richard Bernstein, “Radical Evil: Kant at War with Himself.” 
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the Kantian “propensity to evil,” Arendt defines evil as a suffering from lack 
of being and depth. 
The ontology of Arendt’s conception of evil
We have seen that Kant’s concept of evil locates it in a maxim, and in doing 
so, approaches evil as a moral phenomenon. I now turn to Arendt’s conception 
of evil, which politicizes it and understands it not as a positive propensity, but 
rather as an ontological lack. According to Richard Bernstein, “Arendt (like 
Levinas) believes that the evil burst forth in the Nazi period indicates a rupture 
[emphasis added] with tradition, and reveals the inadequacy of traditional 
accounts of morals and ethics to deal with evil.”27 Traditional theories of evil 
cannot effectively account for the evil committed during the Holocaust because 
they regard evil either as a theological or a moral issue. Bernstein, following 
Arendt, contends that old accounts of evil cannot be deployed to make sense 
of this new form of evil. My argument concerns how Arendt articulates this 
new form of evil through her concept of banality of evil. This notion, I argue, 
presents a new ontology of evil. I begin my reflections by discussing the link 
between Arendt’s notions of radical evil and banality of evil. 
It has been widely noted that Hannah Arendt is the first Continental phi-
losopher to explicitly raise the question of evil to a strictly political level. With 
Arendt’s forceful remarks in the The Origins of Totalitarianism28 and Eichmann 
in Jerusalem, the question of evil rapidly becomes, for her, one of social criti-
cism and political philosophy. Yet there is still a controversy in Arendt schol-
arship as to the relation between her earlier conception of “radical evil” in The 
Origins (1951) and her later formulation of the “banality of evil” in Eichmann 
in Jerusalem (1963).29 Henry Allison’s 1996 essay discusses Arendt’s usage of 
these two terms (radical evil and banality of evil) and offers a comparative 
reading with Kant’s radical evil.30 Allison argues that Arendt’s notions of 
banality of evil and radical evil are very different, even contrastable. To 
27. Richard Bernstein, “Levinas: Evil and the Temptation of Theodicy,” in Radical Evil, 
p. 168.
28. Hereafter cited as Origins. 
29. The controversy regarding Arendt’s notions of “radical evil” and “banality of evil” has 
been underscored by the following scholars: Peg Birmingham, “Holes of Oblivion: The Banality 
of Radical Evil,” Hypatia, 18 (2003), p. 81; Berel Lang, “Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Evil,” 
in Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman (eds.), Hannah Arendt Critical Essays, Albany 
NY, SUNY Press, 1994, p. 44; Adi Ophir, “Between Eichmann and Kant: Thinking on Evil after 
Arendt” History and Memory, 8 (1996), p. 89; Seyla Benhabib, “Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem,” 
in Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, in Dana Villa (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p. 74; Henry E. Allison, “Reflections on the Banality of (Radical) Evil: 
A Kantian Analysis,” in Maria Pia Lara (ed.), Rethinking Evil: Contemporary Perspectives, 
Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 2001. 
30. Henry E. Allison, “Reflections on the Banality of (Radical) Evil: A Kantian Analysis.”
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develop his argument, Allison’s essay begins with a quote by Arendt from her 
letter to Gershom Scholem in July 24, 1963:
It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never “radical,” that it is only extreme, 
and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension [emphasis added]. 
It can over-grow and lay waste the whole world precisely because it spreads like 
a fungus on the surface [emphasis added]. It is “thought-defying,” [emphasis added] 
as I said because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the roots, and the 
moment it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing 
[emphasis added]. That is its “banality.” Only the good has depth and can be 
radical.31
According to Allison, “Arendt is here [in the above passage] contrasting her 
post-Eichmann view of evil with that of her earlier work, The Origins.”32 In 
contrast to Allison, I argue that there is a continuity between these two for-
mulations of evil, and that, furthermore, the inscrutable nature of evil is 
manifested in Arendt’s reflections on the banality of evil. I first examine her 
notions of radical evil and banality of evil, and then return to the above pas-
sage to stress my earlier point about Arendt’s new ontology of evil. I conclude 
that it is within this new ontology of evil that evil gains an inscrutable char-
acter for Arendt.
In Origins, Arendt systematically traces the socio-historical emergence of 
the conditions of Nazi horror and its political implications. Towards the end, 
under the section entitled “Total Domination,” Arendt criticizes the Western 
philosophical tradition, Kant included, for failing to provide an adequate 
understanding of “radical evil”:
It is inherent in our entire philosophical tradition that we cannot conceive of a 
‘radical evil,’ and this is true for both Christian theology […], as well as for Kant, 
the only philosopher who, in the word he coined for it, at least must have sus-
pected the existence of this evil [emphasis added] even though he immediately 
rationalized it in the concept of a “perverted ill will” that could be explained by 
comprehensible motives. Therefore, we actually have nothing to fall back on in 
order to understand a phenomenon that nevertheless confronts us with its over-
powering reality and breaks down all standards we know. There is only one thing 
that seems to be discernible: we may say that radical evil has emerged in connec-
tion with a system in which all men have become equally superfluous.33
Here, by “radical evil,” Arendt means evil that is political in nature and is 
“unprecedented,” exemplified by systematic mass killings and new techniques 
of killing that are developed and organized by a nation-state. It is this phe-
nomenon that has been unknown before. With the term “radical evil,” we are 
31. Hannah Arendt, Jew as Pariah, pp. 250-251.
32. Henry E. Allison, “Reflections on the Banality of (Radical) Evil: A Kantian Analysis,” 
p. 86.
33. Hannah Arendt, Origins, p. 459.
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not in the realm of moral evil, but rather that of political evil. Yet only the 
former has been the concern of the Western philosophical tradition, as she 
concludes above. For such evil to be committed on a “gigantic scale,” it must 
be state-administered, but there is no previous account of evil that addresses 
the state as the originator of evil. Hence, Arendt is criticizing the tradition for 
its lack of political accounts of evil.34 
With regard to the passage above, Allison suggests that Arendt misunder-
stands Kant’s notion of radical evil. He implies that she is not justified in her 
criticism of Kant because she misinterprets Kant’s radical evil as referring to 
a “deeply rooted demonic evil.”35 Yet nowhere in her corpus has Arendt ever 
suggested that Nazi evil had a “demonic” nature. Quite to the contrary, she 
insisted that it “could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, 
pathology.”36 It appears that Allison’s above misreading of Arendt issues from 
his commitment to distinguishing what he identifies as “Arendt’s earlier and 
post-Eichmann views of evil,” as if these two are entirely different conceptions 
of evil. This becomes clear with Allison’s further suggestion that, despite 
Arendt’s misreading of Kant’s notion of radical evil, Kant’s notion of radical 
evil is similar to Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil, because both Kant and 
Arendt reject the idea that evildoing is related to the possession of a demonic 
nature.37 Allison assumes that Arendt entirely changed her views about evil 
when she attended the trial of Adolf Eichmann. In distinction to Allison, I 
think that with the term “banality of evil,” Arendt emphasizes the conditions 
34. We could pause here and ask whether the Holocaust was “unprecedented,” as Arendt 
claims. And if it was unprecedented, can Arendt blame Kant for not providing an adequate 
account? Or rather, was the Holocaust an intensified version of old forms of evil-doing, but now 
taking place at the heart of Europe, effectively put into practice with the scientific racism of the 
day, which had been previously developed to maintain and support the ideological basis of the 
Transatlantic slave trade and other colonialist endeavours? There is common agreement that the 
discourses and practices of anti-Semitism, which were at the core of the genocidal act, were 
already part of the governing ideologies of Europe, centuries before the Nazis came to power. 
In addition, German rulers had already practiced the extermination of the Herero people in 
South West Africa at the beginning of the 20th century. Furthermore, as Eric Weitz notes, 
“German military and civilian officials supported the Young Turk government and, thereby, 
became complicit in the Armenian Genocide.” Cf. Eric D. Weitz, “Germany and the Young 
Turks,” in A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire, in 
Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, Norman M. Naimark (eds.), Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011, pp. 196-197. I think all of the above suggest a continuity and not a rupture 
in politically and ideologically motivated evildoing. Perhaps the continuity is highlighted most 
significantly by Hitler’s famous remark, “who still talks nowadays about the extermination of 
the Armenians?”
35. Henry Allison, “Reflections on The Banality of (Radical) Evil: A Kantian Analysis,” 
p. 87.
36. Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” in Responsibility and Judgment, 
New York NY, Schocken Books, 2003, p. 159. Originally published in 1971. 
37. Henry Allison, “Reflections on The Banality of (Radical) Evil: A Kantian Analysis,” 
p. 87.
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of emergence (at the individual level) of the radical evil she identifies as Nazi 
totalitarianism. And I contend that Arendt’s point with regard to Kant is 
accurate insofar as she wants to underscore the trajectory of thought within 
which Kant’s ideas about evil operate. Kant does not consider the concept of 
evil to have any political implications, at least within the scope of his doctrine 
of radical evil. 
According to Arendt in the Origins, Nazi evil is radical in the sense of its 
“unprecedented” nature. It was unknown to us in two senses. First, this evil 
involved total domination, and was enabled by the technology of the concen-
tration camps, the gas chambers and all the methods used to render man 
“superfluous.” According to Arendt, there were three steps to rendering man 
superfluous, which required total domination. In the attempt to achieve total 
domination, the Nazi government first attacked “the juridical person.” This 
meant that the rapid criminalization of Jews and other victims was followed 
by deprivation of rights. The second step was to kill “the moral person,” refer-
ring to the fact that Nazis specifically aimed at corrupting solidarity among 
the inmates.38 The third step was to kill “the individuality of the person.” On 
this point, Arendt writes, “once the moral person has been killed, the one thing 
that still prevents men from being made into living corpses is the differentia-
tion of the individual, his unique identity.”39 Stripping individuals of their 
spontaneity was possible only by means of total domination, and the Nazis’ 
supreme political principle aimed at precisely that. Total domination was the 
inevitable result of Nazi rule and was only possible by making all complicit in 
the crime: 
Through the creation of conditions under which conscience ceases to be adequate 
and to do good becomes utterly impossible, the consciously organized complicity 
of all men in the crimes of totalitarian regimes is extended to the victims and 
thus made really total.40 
The second sense in which the evil of the Nazi regime was unprecedented 
was in its “non-appearance” as evil. At the time of these “crimes against 
humanity,” the German people were not able to identify “the evil” that was 
taking place. This was again, according to Arendt, the effect of total domina-
tion, the end result of which was the creation of a social world where people 
never realized what they were doing.41 I think this is the point at which 
Arendt’s notions of radical evil and banality of evil merge.
38. Hannah Arendt, Origins, p. 452.
39. Hannah Arendt, Origins, p. 453.
40. Hannah Arendt, Origins, p. 452.
41. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil, New York 
NY, Penguin Books, 2006, p. 288.
SE 70.3.corr.indd   351 2018-07-31   9:23 AM
  .  oranlı 
It is the appearance of some radical evil, previously unknown to us [emphasis 
added], […] the realization that something seems to be involved in modern poli-
tics that actually should never be involved in politics […], namely, all or nothing 
[emphasis added].42
It was this “nothing” at which the Nazis aimed, according to Arendt. And 
again it was this “nothing” that prevented the evil of the Nazi regime from 
appearing to the German public as “evil.” This point about “nothing” brings 
us to the discussion of Arendt’s new ontology of evil. Arendt stresses the 
ontologically negative nature of evil in her later writings. In 1963, in the book 
based on her report on Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, Arendt for the 
first time suggests the term “banality of evil.”43 Here, she clearly indicates that 
banality of evil refers to a phenomenon: 
When I speak of the banality of evil, I do so only on the strictly factual level, 
pointing to a phenomenon which stared one in the face at the trial. […] It was 
sheer thoughtlessness [emphasis added] – something by no means identical with 
stupidity – that predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals of that 
period.44 
The phenomenon which she uncovers is Adolf Eichmann, who is a para-
digmatic example of a person who cannot distinguish right from wrong.45 
Arendt contends that “he [Eichmann] had no motives at all”; in fact, he “never 
realized what he was doing.”46 This testifies to his “sheer thoughtlessness”47. 
Faced with Eichmann’s disposition during his trial, Arendt sees a “quite 
authentic inability to think,” proposing that the nature of Eichmann’s evildo-
ing was “banal.”48 
In Origins, Arendt had identified the total domination of Nazi rule as 
“radical” evil. Attending Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, she observed that 
such a domination produced subjects whose evil was “banal,” i.e., “without 
depth.” Arendt highlights this point in her 1971 essay, “Thinking and Moral 
Considerations”: 
42. Hannah Arendt, Origins, p. 443.
43. However, long before Arendt formulated her notion of the banality of evil in the 1963 
publication, it had first been suggested by Karl Jaspers in his October 19, 1946 letter to Arendt. 
In the letter, Jaspers writes: “It seems to me that we have to see these things in their total banal-
ity [emphasis added], in their prosaic triviality, because that’s what truly characterizes them. 
Bacteria can cause epidemics that wipe out nations, but they remain merely bacteria.” Hannah 
Arendt - Karl Jaspers: Correspondence 1926-1969, ed. Lotte Kohler and Jans Saner, trans. 
Robert and Rita Kimber, New York NY, Harcourt Brace, 1992, p. 62.
44. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 287.
45. Seyla Benhabib suggests that “Eichmann becomes for her a paradigm case”: “Arendt’s 
Eichmann in Jerusalem,” in Dana Villa (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 68.
46. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 287.
47. Ibid.
48. Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” p. 159.
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Some years ago, reporting the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem, I spoke of “the 
banality of evil” and meant with this no theory or doctrine but something quite 
factual, the phenomenon of evil deeds, committed on a gigantic scale, which could 
not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, pathology, or ideological convic-
tion in the doer, whose only personal distinction was a perhaps extraordinary 
shallowness [emphasis added].49 
As we can see above, with the notion of banality of evil, Arendt wants to 
stress that this evil “committed on a gigantic scale” cannot be traced back to 
the intentions of the individual. It is this point that she communicates when 
she writes, “[h]owever monstrous the deeds were, the doer [Eichmann] was 
neither monstrous nor demonic.”50 On this point, Berel Lang rightly claims 
that Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil captures a “new kind of evil-doer.”51 
This new kind of evil-doer is the production of a new form of political life, 
namely, totalitarianism. The implication of Lang’s interpretation is that we 
need to think of forms of evil as productions of certain ideologies and of 
politics.52 In other words, “banality of evil” is a phrase for understanding how 
one could take part in the production of evil on a gigantic scale by participat-
ing in a social rule that is robustly totalitarian. 
Now, let’s turn back to the first quote that I referred to at the very begin-
ning of my discussion of Arendt:
[E]vil […] possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension [emphasis added]. 
It can over-grow and lay waste the whole world precisely because it spreads like 
a fungus [emphasis added]. It is “thought-defying,” [emphasis added] as I said 
because […] the moment it [thought] concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated 
because there is nothing [emphasis added]. That is its “banality.” 53
In this passage, Arendt explicitly concludes that evil is inscrutable. This new 
evil is inscrutable because it cannot be traced back to a cause within the sub-
ject, nor does it have a being of its own. It presents a fungus-like behavior, 
which feeds off of and destroys the living organism to which it is attached. 
Nazi evil “spread[s] like a fungus,” this is why it is “extreme” yet without any 
depth, and whenever thought tries to engage with this evil there is “nothing” 
to grasp. In this depiction of evil, wherein “banality” refers to a “lack of depth,” 
we can clearly detect a peculiar and new ontology of evil. Arendt’s reading of 
Eichmann underscores this fungus-like behavior, a man “whose only personal 
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Berel Lang, “Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Evil,” p. 49 (emphasis not mine).
52. According to this logic, then, the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism should force us to 
devise another kind of concept or notion (that is to say, an intellectual toolkit) that can capture 
the kind of evil these horrific acts present.
53. Hannah Arendt, Jew as Pariah, pp. 250-251.
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distinction was perhaps extraordinary shallowness.”54 It is this lack of depth 
that turned him into one of the worst war criminals of the 20th century.
Charles Mathewes suggests that Arendt’s analysis of Eichmann brings her 
close to the Augustinian conception of evil as privation.55 I agree that Arendt’s 
emphasis on the negative character of evil is Augustinian.56 It is precisely this 
negative ontology of evil, articulated through the concept of banality of evil, 
that underlies the difference between Arendt’s and Kant’s formulations. As we 
have seen above, Kant does not understand evil negatively, but rather positively 
– through the affirmation of a propensity to evil in human nature. 
My discussion of Arendt’s criticism of Kantian radical evil was partially 
oriented by a polemical engagement with Allison’s essay. This polemic allowed 
me to clarify the distinction between Arendt’s and Kant’s notions of radical 
evil. And moreover, it facilitated my argument concerning the banality of evil, 
as a more in-depth analysis of the operation of radical evil at the level of the 
individual. 
In the beginning of this section, I mentioned Bernstein’s claim that the 
Holocaust constitutes a rupture in the thinking of evil for both Levinas and 
Arendt. I demonstrated that this rupture, for Arendt, is the result of a “new 
kind of evil-doer” and implies a new ontology of evil. Levinas addresses the 
same phenomenon (Nazi evil) with a different terminology and methodology. 
His phenomenological and existential analysis of the suffering body marks 
both his engagement with the question of evil and his difference from Arendt.
The experience of evil: Levinas’ existential and phenomenological 
approach 
We have seen from our previous discussion that Kant wishes to think the 
question of evil non-theologically. With a similar gesture, Levinas insists on 
locating the question beyond the paradigm of theodicy. In this section, I argue 
that Levinas follows Kant in formulating an understanding of evil that is at 
once inscrutable and rejects theodicy. Yet unlike both Kant and Arendt, his 
54. Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” p. 159.
55. Charles Mathewes’ study Evil and the Augustinian Tradition focuses on Arendt, whose 
treatment of evil, he argues, falls within the Augustinian tradition. According to Mathewes, 
“Arendt’s work on totalitarianism and ‘the banality of evil’ develops an Augustinian account of 
evil as privation […]” (p. 7). Mathewes further argues that Arendt follows Augustine in claiming 
that “evil is nothing precisely because it is wholly negative, a self-annihilating vacuum […].” 
(p. 151) Arendt’s depiction of Eichmann is her way of suggesting that evil is merely a defect. 
According to Mathewes, “her claim that Eichmann’s evil is banal implied simply that Eichmann’s 
shallowness was as deep as evil could go” (p. 168): cf. Charles Mathewes, Evil and the 
Augustinian Tradition, New York NY, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
56. The scope of this article does not allow me to further elaborate the Augustinian roots 
of Arendt’s notion of banality of evil. Though, I should note that my interpretation is very much 
influenced by Mathewes’ above-mentioned study. 
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approach to evil is robustly phenomenological and existential. As we shall see, 
Levinas is concerned with the question of evil at the level of existence, and 
here, the notion of “suffering” is key. It addresses physical evil experienced at 
the level of the body.
Reading Paul Davies’ article, “Sincerity and the end of theodicy”57, one is 
assured that a comparative reading of Kant and Levinas is a favorable path for 
situating Levinas’ ethical project. Davies clearly shows that Levinas’ notion of 
“responsibility, always asymmetrically and sincerely for the other [emphasis in 
original], belongs to the analysis of an affectivity that contrasts sharply and 
deliberately with that of [Kantian] respect.”58 Kant and Levinas differ in their 
formulations of how one becomes an ethical self; for Kant it is an active and 
willful endeavor, whereas for Levinas, becoming responsible for the other is 
not determined by my decision. Levinas writes, “the responsibility for the 
other cannot have begun in my commitment, in my decision.”59 My analysis 
below will develop out of the assessment of Levinas’ ethical project as a reflec-
tion upon and a response to Kant’s moral philosophy.
I agree with Paul Davies’ suggestion that Levinas offers a “polemical 
engagement with Kant,” where the latter situates ethical responsibility in one’s 
respect for the moral law, grounded in an autonomous being, who is fully 
active in her appropriation of the moral law; whereas for the former, it is pas-
sivity that signifies my relationship with the other. I suggest that we can nev-
ertheless detect three fundamental themes that Levinas’ ethical theorization 
shares with Kant’s. These themes are as follows: 1) the rejection of theodicy; 
2) the ethics of transcendence; and 3) the inscrutable character of evil.60 
Following from these common themes, Levinas and Kant formulate an 
understanding of evil that is, on the one hand, inscrutable, and, on the other, 
rejects theodicy. Leaving aside the diverging formation of ethical subjectivity 
in Kant and Levinas that Davies rightly identifies, it should be noted that both 
57. Paul Davies, “Sincerity and the end of theodicy: three remarks on Levinas and Kant,” 
in Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Levinas, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
58. Paul Davies, “Sincerity and the end of theodicy,” p. 163. Peter Dews also offers a com-
parative analysis that underscores the similarities and differences of Levinas’ and Kant’s ethical 
projects (“Levinas: Ethics à l’Outrance,” in The Idea of Evil, pp. 160-179). In particular, the issue 
of transcendence, namely, the requirement that my relationship to the other must transcend all 
determinations of the social sphere, is at the core of both theories of ethics.
59. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis, 
Pittsburgh PA, Duquesne University Press, 1998, p. 10.
60. For the purposes of my argument, I focus only on the first and the third points. The 
second point would require me to offer an analysis of Kant’s ethical theory beginning from his 
earlier writings. The necessity of the categorical imperative for Kant’s morality, which gives it 
its transcendent character, is explicitly articulated in the Groundwork. Similarly, the central role 
of transcendence in Levinasian ethics is articulated in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than 
Being, the discussion of which would exceed the scope of this paper.
SE 70.3.corr.indd   355 2018-07-31   9:23 AM
  .  oranlı 
philosophers project these two characteristics (i.e., the inscrutability of evil 
and the rejection of theodicy) in the service of their radical ethics. 
In the scholarship there is agreement that Levinas’ philosophical oeuvre 
can be read as a response to evil.61 I consider the following four texts as essen-
tial for understanding Levinas’ approach to the question of evil: “Reflections 
on the Philosophy of Hitlerism”62 (1934); Existence and Existents63 (1947); 
“Transcendence and Evil” (1978); and “Useless Suffering,” (1982).64 Within 
these texts, three notions orient Levinas’ discussion of evil: “elemental Evil,” 
the “horror of being,” and “useless suffering.” I begin my exposition with 
“elemental Evil” and offer a reading that connects it with the other two terms. 
“Elemental Evil” is the definitive term in Levinas’ 1934 essay “Reflections.” 
In fact, he states that the purpose of the essay is to express “elemental Evil,” 
which he identifies with the horror of National Socialism. Here, the term 
“elemental” refers to the “elementary feelings” of blood and flesh. Hitlerism 
claims a re-appropriation of the realm of the body.65 In the opposite direction, 
we find Western liberalism and Christian universalism residing within the 
same trajectory, one in which “man is absolutely free in his relations with the 
world”66, as opposed to the philosophy of Hitlerism in which man is “chained 
to his body, […] refusing the power to escape from himself.”67 Hence, Hitlerism 
pits communal “fate” against the “freedom” of spirit. According to Levinas, 
in calling for “rootedness” in facticity, Hitlerism denies “freedom,” “infinity” 
and “transcendence,” and this is the point that brings together the philosophies 
of Heidegger and Hitlerism. For Levinas, Heideggerian ontology is an “ontol-
ogy of a being concerned with being.”68 As we shall see shortly, in contrast to 
Heidegger, Levinas wishes to articulate “the Being independent of beings,” 
through his notion of “there is” (“il y a”).
61. Richard Bernstein, “Levinas: Evil and The Temptation of Theodicy,” p. 167; Simona 
Forti, New Demons Rethinking Power and Evil Today, trans. Zakiya Hanafi, Standford CA, 
Standford University Press, 2014, p. 109. Howard Caygill suggests that the “revenge of evil” is 
central to the project of Totality and Infinity: cf. Howard Caygill, Levinas and the Political, 
New York NY, Routledge, 2002, p. 98.
62. Emmanuel Levinas, “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” Critical Inquiry, 
17 (1990), pp. 63-71, hereafter cited as “Reflections.” The publication years in brackets refer to 
the originals French texts.
63. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh PA, 
Duquesne University Press, 2001. 
64. Emmanuel Levinas, “Transcendence and Evil,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh PA, Duquesne University Press, 1998, pp. 175-186.
65. Simon Critchley stresses that for Levinas, “National Socialism is a philosophy of the 
elemental”: cf. “Levinas and Hitlerism,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 35 (2014), p. 227.
66. Emmanuel Levinas, “Reflections,” p. 64.
67. Emmanuel Levinas, “Reflections,” p. 70.
68. Emmanuel Levinas, “Reflections,” p. 63. Robert Bernasconi clarifies what is at stake 
for Levinas in Heidegger’s ontology. He writes, “whereas Heidegger had insisted that Being is 
always the Being of a being, Levinas sought access to Being independent of beings.” (Foreword 
to Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. xi)
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In “Reflections,” Levinas writes, “man’s essence no longer lies in freedom, 
but in a kind of bondage.”69 The racism of Hitlerism is constructed against the 
liberal ideal of the free spirit not bound by history and that which transcends 
the body. Levinas contends that “the importance attributed to this feeling for 
the body, with which the Western spirit has never wished to content itself, is at 
the basis of a new conception of man.”70 This new conception of man promised 
by Hitlerism projects itself through the communal bond of racial solidarity.
It is my contention that one can read Levinas’ Existence and Existents as 
a phenomenological analysis of the “elemental Evil” that Levinas identified in 
the “Reflections.” The central position of the body in Nazi ideology, in which 
the body understood as race is at the root of racial solidarity, gives way to 
racial purification, which then necessitates, according to Hitlerism, the elim-
ination of the other’s body. Hence, Nazi ideology targets the body of the Other. 
This is why, in each of his writings about evil, Levinas emphasizes that the 
experience of evil is an embodied experience. This is also the very point of 
Existence and Existents. 
Levinas is very explicit about his criticism of Heideggerian ontology in the 
introduction to Existence and Existents, where he stresses that his aim is to 
challenge Heidegger for not recognizing the tragic aspect of existence, what 
Levinas here calls an “underlying evil in its very positivity.”71 Levinas’ essay 
“Transcendence and Evil” makes a similar point, once again criticizing 
Heidegger.72 Hence, these two texts also deal with the question of evil through 
an engagement with and criticism of Heideggerian ontology.
The concept that marks Existence and Existents is the “horror of being,” 
or, as Levinas sometimes calls it, the “tragedy of existence.” For Levinas, the 
tragedy of existence need not entail any diabolical element to be horrific; the 
tragedy of existence is testified to by the very struggle for life – in the Nazi 
camps. He writes, “already in what is called the struggle for life […] there is 
the objective of existence itself, bare existence […].”73 I suffer when I am 
deprived of the needs required to satisfy my embodied life, when the mere fact 
of existence appears to be burdensome and horrific. In this text, Levinas 
mainly opposes the privileging of Dasein’s neutral relation to the world – the 
fact that the world is not described as having impediments, horrors and evils, 
but rather one in which Dasein finds itself “free to choose” in caring for it or 
being absorbed in idle talk. Hence, Levinas’ reflections here are “governed by 
69. Emmanuel Levinas, “Reflections,” p. 69.
70. Ibid.
71. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh PA, 
Duquesne University Press, 2001, p. 4.
72. Emmanuel Levinas, “Transcendence and Evil,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh PA, Duquesne University Press, 1998, p. 178.
73. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 10.
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a profound need to leave the climate of that [Heideggerian] philosophy.”74 
Levinas sees in Heideggerian ontology no evil at the existential level. 
Moreover, Dasein’s existence is personal; by contrast, for Levinas, existence 
is anonymous. It refers to the horizon at which I find my experience among 
others’ experiences. Contra Heidegger, for whom Dasein is “in each case 
mine,” for Levinas existence does not belong to the individual. Rather, Levinas 
describes a movement from the anonymity of “existence” (i.e., “the Being 
independent of beings,” in other words, there is or il y a) to an “existent.” He 
identifies this process as burdensome. The existence is not given, but is taken 
up by the existent, because it entails effort. While for Heidegger Dasein’s 
anxiety arises with respect to its own finitude, according to Levinas, existence 
itself is horrific and causes anxiety. Levinas writes, “existence of itself [empha-
sis added] harbors something tragic which is not only there because of its 
finitude.”75 Existence is tragic because one lives with a body that can suffer.
Levinas re-articulates this point in “Transcendence and Evil,” where he 
states that “physical evil is the very depth of anxiety. [A]nxiety in its carnal 
severity, is the root of all social miseries, all human dereliction.”76 In contrast 
to Heidegger, for whom “the essential in anxiety” is being towards death, 
Levinas agrees with Philip Nemo about the “conjunction of evil and anxiety” 
conditioned by a bodily existence.77 Evil shows itself in the form of bodily 
harm, damage and suffering and not necessarily in death. The tragedy of 
existence comes to the fore when to be is to suffer as body. This suffering is 
“excessive” according to Levinas. It is this very relation between bodily suf-
fering and evil’s excessive nature that orients Levinas’ formulation of evil as 
an inscrutable experience. 
In “Transcendence and Evil,” Levinas stresses evil’s inscrutability due to 
its excessive nature:
In its malignancy as evil, evil is an excess. While the notion of excess evokes first 
the quantitative idea of intensity, of a degree surpassing measure, evil is an excess 
in its very quiddity. This notation is very important: evil is not an excess because 
suffering can be terrible, and go beyond the endurable. The break with the normal 
and the normative, with order, with synthesis, with the world already constitutes 
its qualitative essence. Suffering qua suffering is but a concrete and quasi-sensible 
manifestation of the non-integratable, the non-justifiable.78 
74. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 4.
75. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5.
76. Emmanuel Levinas, “Transcendence and Evil,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh PA, Duquesne University Press, 1998, p. 179.
77. 77. Ibid. 
78. Emmanuel Levinas, “Transcendence and Evil,” p. 180. With respect to this passage, 
Bernstein underscores that it is this excessive nature of evil that makes it incomprehensible 
according to Levinas. My analysis agrees with Bernstein’s on this point. However, he reads this 
incomprehensibility in connection with Kant’s idea of the sublime and does not link it to the 
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As he suggests above, evil is excessive, but this does not refer to a quantitative 
measure. Evil is excessive not because there is too much bodily suffering. Here, 
the term excess designates “non-integratability” and “non-justifiability.” This 
is the sense in which Levinas construes evil as an excess, and thereby, as an 
incomprehensible experience.
I would like to stress further evil’s inscrutability in Levinas by focusing on 
the essay “Useless Suffering.” This is Levinas’ final text specifically on the 
question of evil. The text involves, on the one hand, a phenomenological 
analysis of suffering, and on the other, a critique of theodicy. With the term 
“useless evil,” Levinas’ intention is to offer a thinking of evil beyond theodicy, 
because according to Levinas, theodicy tames evil and makes it “integratable.” 
He states: “Beliefs presupposed by Theodicy! That is the grand idea necessary 
to the inner peace of souls in our distressed world. It is called upon to make 
sufferings here below comprehensible.”79 According to Simona Forti, with the 
term “theodicy,” Levinas explicitly refers to “the temptation to make the suf-
fering of the innocent bearable by giving a meaning.”80 Against theodicy, 
Levinas coins the term “useless evil.” Evil is “useless” in the sense that it is not 
a part of a greater whole. It is “the non-integratable” and “the non-justifiable,” 
as the above quote from “Transcendence and Evil” suggests. Evil has no spe-
cific purpose; it is not accountable. Evil is found at the level of existence, which 
is always already bodily. It is the experience of the suffering body that turns 
one’s existence into an “anonymous existence.” When one suffers in the Nazi 
camps, one suffers not as an individual, as Arendt also states, but as a species, 
as a “living corpse.” Hence, one suffers anonymously. Anonymity of suffering 
is anonymity of bodily presence.
Levinas’ prior phenomenological analysis of suffering in Existence and 
Existents is key to understanding his analysis of “useless evil.”81 This analysis 
shows why he rejects the taming of evil by theodicy, since integration – the 
very aim of theodicy – does further injustice to the dead who are awaiting 
justice.82 Hence, for Levinas, “useless evil” means “useless suffering,” a suffer-
ing that cannot be integrated. In “Useless Suffering,” the excess of suffering is 
described with the following words: 
inscrutable nature of radical evil: cf. Richard J. Bernstein, “Levinas: Evil and The Temptation 
of Theodicy,” p. 175.
79. Emmanuel Levinas, “Useless Suffering,” in Entre Nous, trans. Michael B. Smith and 
Barbara Harshav, New York NY, Continuum, 2006, p. 82.
80. Simona Forti, New Demons, p. 110.
81. Here “useless” is used in the sense of not being oriented towards a purpose.
82. Howard Caygill expresses this point as follows: “The horror of il y a is intricately bound 
to haunting, to the dead who cannot be forgotten – il y a is the continual ‘presence’ of the mur-
dered awaiting justice. The pressure of this responsibility lends urgency and rigour to the refusal 
of any ontology that would privilege the projects and the acts of the living.” (“Levinas and the 
Political,” p. 52) 
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an excess, an unwelcome superfluity, that is inscribed in a sensorial content, 
penetrating, as suffering, the dimensions of meaning that seem to open them-
selves to it, or become grafted onto it. […] It is as if suffering were not just a datum, 
[…] but the way in which the refusal, opposing the assemblage of data into a 
meaningful whole, rejects it; at once what disturbs order and this disturbance 
itself.83 
As the above passage suggests, suffering, although it presents itself as a “sen-
sorial content,” is a content that cannot be read just as a “datum.” A datum 
makes sense; it is part of a larger whole. A datum gives meaning. In contrast, 
suffering is described as an intentionality, as a “way” of relating, which gains its 
meaning in refusal. Suffering refuses integration; it is both refusing something 
else and the act of refusing. Levinas defines suffering as an “excess.” Later in 
the text, he also indicates that it is a “modality,” a “passivity.”84 The passivity of 
suffering is what makes suffering evil.85 In bodily suffering there is no “I” that 
can escape it. Suffering captures me as an anonymous being, because it reduces 
me to pure body, and this happens for no purpose, “for nothing” (this is its 
uselessness). Suffering is the passive experience of the “horror of being,” when 
the body that is the cause of suffering chains me to an anonymous existence.
Levinas’ phenomenological analysis of the “horror of being” and his con-
cept of “useless suffering” attest to an ontology of evil where evil is not a lack 
of being, but rather an excess of being. This is what makes it beyond compre-
hension. Similarly, with Kant’s notion of radical evil, evil is not a lack of being, 
but is positive in the sense that it refers to a propensity of human nature, and 
it is this propensity that makes it unaccountable. For both thinkers, then, evil 
has a positive ontological status and is inscrutable. Their point of divergence 
is that Levinas discusses evil’s inscrutability within the context of the 
Holocaust. He focuses on the experience of evil from an existential and phe-
nomenological point of view, whereas Kant speaks of evil as a moral issue. 
Nonetheless, both thinkers understood the phenomenon of evil as possessing 
a positive ontological status, which led them to formulate their ethical theories 
in such a radical fashion.
Conclusion
As I have shown above, each thinker means something quite different by 
inscrutability, while at the same time all agree that the phenomenon of evil is 
unaccountable and inscrutable. For Levinas, the excessive character of evil 
results from its “useless” nature; it is experienced as a non-integratable ele-
83. Emmanuel Levinas, “Useless Suffering, p. 78.
84. Emmanuel Levinas, “Useless Suffering, p. 79.
85. Ibid.
SE 70.3.corr.indd   360 2018-07-31   9:23 AM
arendt  and  levinas  :  evil’s  inscrutability
ment. This point can also be found in Origins when Arendt refers to the 
pragmatic “uselessness” of the committed acts: 
The incredibility of the horrors is closely bound up with their economic useless-
ness. The Nazis carried this uselessness to the point of open anti-utility when in 
the midst of war, despite the shortage of building material and rolling stock, they 
set up enormous, costly extermination factories and transported millions of 
people back and forth.86 
Arendt notes that it is precisely this “uselessness” that conditions total destruc-
tion and gives totalitarianism its essence.87 It is important to note that by the 
term “uselessness,” these thinkers do not mean “serving no purpose.” Rather, 
they refer to a kind of evil that aims at total destruction and that cannot be 
rationalized away as a means to an end. The act of killing millions of people 
had no ulterior aim apart from their destruction; it was precisely their destruc-
tion that was the goal. 
My discussion of Arendt and Levinas shows that their treatment of evil is 
nonetheless haunted by a trajectory of thinking that stresses the incompre-
hensible nature of evil. Although both thinkers orient our discussion of evil 
through an existential-political lens that transcends previous accounts of evil, 
the very vocabulary they use still expresses evil’s inscrutability. Hence, I have 
demonstrated the continuity between Kant, Levinas and Arendt by focusing 
on the notion of evil’s inscrutability, while at the same time underlining how 
Levinas and Arendt differ from Kant. For Levinas, evil is inscrutable because 
it refers to the excessive state of bodily suffering. As distinguished from this, 
Arendt’s explanation of evil’s inscrutability is linked to evil’s lack of being 
because there is no-thing to comprehend. 
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Since 2001, Continental philosophical studies of evil suggest that we are forced 
to rethink the category of evil as we face acts of terrorism on a global scale. In 
light of this suggestion, this paper traces the idea of the “inscrutability of evil” 
as a common lens through which we associate the category of evil with the 
phenomena we identify as evil. This idea finds its first modern formulation in 
Kant’s theory of radical evil. In this article, I argue that Hannah Arendt and 
86. Hannah Arendt, Origins, p. 445.
87. Hannah Arendt, Origins, p. 456.
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Emmanuel Levinas follow Kant in identifying evil as an inscrutable phenom-
enon. While they all agree that evil cannot be rationalized, integrated into 
reason, or understood within the framework of a theodicy, for Kant, evil is 
inscrutable because it is grounded in freedom; for Arendt, evil is inscrutable 
because it is “banal;” and for Levinas, evil is inscrutable because it is “excessive” 
and “useless.” My analysis demonstrates that inscrutability is an essential 
marker of the concept of evil, since it is found in all three accounts as a feature 
of evil, regardless of the fact that in each account a different type of evil is at 
stake (moral, political and existential).
sommair e
Depuis 2001, la réflexion philosophique continentale sur la question du mal 
met de l’avant l’idée que la confrontation à l’expérience répandue du terrorisme 
nous force à repenser la notion même du mal. Dans cette perspective, cet article 
scrute l’idée du caractère impénétrable du mal comme lentille commune à 
travers laquelle nous associons la notion du mal au phénomène que nous iden-
tifions comme tel. Cette idée a trouvé sa première formulation moderne chez 
Kant dans sa théorie du mal radical. Selon la perspective que je développe ici, 
Hannah Arendt et Emmanuel Levinas s’inscrivent dans la suite de Kant en 
identifiant le mal comme un phénomène impénétrable. S’ils s’entendent pour 
affirmer que le mal ne saurait être rationnalisé, soit en étant intégré du point 
de vue rationnel, soit en étant compris dans le cadre d’une théodicée, les trois 
rendent compte différemment de son caractère impénétrable : pour Kant, en 
tant que le mal s’enracine dans la liberté, pour Arendt en tant qu’il est “banal”, 
pour Levinas en tant qu’il s’avère “excessif” et “inutile”. Chez les trois cepen-
dant, le caractère énigmatique se présente comme une composante essentielle 
de la notion du mal, celui-ci étant envisagé dans chaque cas sous un angle 
différent, soit moral, soit politique, soit existentiel. 
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